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T

he Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, commonly known
as the Hatch–Waxman Act, aims
to strike a balance between the
innovation incentives provided by
patents and the greater access
provided by low-cost generic
drugs. The legislation, which relies in part on an explicit link between the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug-approval
process and the U.S. patent system, has been controversial, particularly because of the ways in
which firms producing brandname drugs have exploited that
link to delay market entry of generics as long as possible. Now,
the tactical landscape has shifted
again, with a recently decided Supreme Court case, Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk.
Under current FDA regulations, the developer of a brandname drug must submit all patents that it deems to cover the
drug to the FDA for publication
in the agency’s Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations — the so-called Orange Book. Before marketing a
generic version of a drug, the generics manufacturer must certify
that all Orange Book patents for
the brand-name product are invalid, are not infringed by the
generic product, or have expired.
Certifications that patents that
are invalid or not infringed,
known as Paragraph IV certifications, allow the brand-name
drug maker to sue the generics
manufacturer to resolve questions
of validity and infringement. As

a result, FDA approval of the generic drug can be delayed for up
to 30 months pending legal resolution.
Orange Book listings can include both product patents on
small-molecule chemicals and patents on methods of use for treating particular conditions. FDA
regulations require that, in addition to patent numbers and expiration dates, method-of-use patents must have “use codes” that
describe their scope.
Frequently, the main product
patent on a brand-name drug expires before the use patents do.
In that case, FDA regulations
based on Hatch–Waxman allow
generics firms the option of filing a “section viii statement,”
which “carves out” from the generic label those uses on which
the brand-name firm still has
patents. If the FDA finds this
narrower labeling acceptable from
the standpoint of safety and efficacy, the generic version has a
potential path to market.
Brand-name drug manufacturers have sometimes tried to sue
to prevent market entry by generics companies that file section
viii statements, typically arguing
that although a generics firm
may not be directly infringing a
use patent, it should be prohibited from marketing its product
because such marketing will inevitably “induce” infringement.
In other words, the generic-substitution practices of doctors and
pharmacists — encouraged by
FDA approval of “carved-out” generics as fully substitutable for
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brand-name drugs and by laws
in many states — will inevitably
lead to prescription of generic
drugs for patented uses. Moreover, brand-name pharmaceutical firms argue that generics
firms should be held liable because they are well aware that
their products will be prescribed
and dispensed in an infringing
manner.
The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, the intermediate
appellate court for patent cases,
has held that as a procedural
matter, courts may hear suits
brought by brand-name firms in
response to a section viii statement filing. However, it has generally rejected the substantive
claim of induced infringement,
holding that because inducement
requires more than mere knowledge that infringement is occurring, the generics firm cannot be
held liable unless it specifically
promoted the drug for a carvedout use.1
In recent years, carve-out labeling has assumed a prominent
role in facilitating market entry
of generics. For example, in fiscal year 2010, the FDA approved
11 generic drugs with carve-out
labeling. In fact, 3 of the 5 topselling brand-name drugs that
“went generic” that year did so as
a consequence of such labeling.2
On occasion, brand-name drug
manufacturers have attempted to
defeat carve-out attempts by listing use codes that substantially
exceed the scope of the use patent. This tactic can be effective,
since the FDA does not evaluate

august 9, 2012

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127333

491

PERSPE C T I V E

Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives

representations of patent information in use codes.3
In April 2012, however, the Supreme Court issued a decision enabling generics firms to challenge
the submission to the FDA of
overly broad use claims. In Caraco,
Novo Nordisk’s only unexpired
patent covered a relatively narrow
use — treating non–insulin-dependent diabetes by combining its
diabetes drug repaglinide with
another drug, metformin. In the
Orange Book, however, Novo Nordisk listed a much broader use
code that covered all methods for
“improving glycemic control in
adults with type 2 diabetes mellitus,” thereby denying generics
firms a meaningful carve-out.

cision is correct. Both the language and legislative history of
the 2003 amendments indicate
that Congress intended to control inaccurate Orange Book listing practices with respect to
product patents and method-ofuse patents. Such misleading practices had been thoroughly documented in a 2002 Federal Trade
Commission report. However, as
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence points out, the mechanism provided by Congress is far
from optimal. A claim to correct
overbreadth can be filed only if
the generics firm chooses to provoke litigation by filing a Paragraph IV certification and the
brand-name firm then sues for

If the main product patent on a brand-name
drug expires before the use patents do,
generics firms can apply to the FDA to
“carve out” patented uses from the generic
label and potentially gain a path to market.
The key question in this case
was whether amendments to
Hatch–Waxman implemented in
2003 allowed generics firms, in the
course of a patent-infringement
lawsuit brought by the brandname company, to file a counterclaim to correct overly broad listings of Orange Book use codes.
The unanimous opinion of the
Court, delivered by Justice Elena
Kagan, held that the amendments were indeed intended to
correct such overbreadth. As Kagan noted, absent the ability to
correct overbreadth, a company
could not market a generic drug
for noninfringing uses.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court de-
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infringement. An administrative
approach to determining the accuracy of Orange Book listings
— an approach in which the FDA
might, for example, consult with
the Patent and Trademark Office
— would clearly be more efficient.
Lurking behind these technical legal disputes over carve-outs,
induced infringement, and overly
broad Orange Book listings is the
broader policy issue of providing
incentives to search for new uses.
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies argue that the pervasive
distribution of generic drugs for
patented uses substantially undermines the efficacy of such patents and hence the incentives for
finding other uses.4
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Strong incentives are probably
unnecessary for purposes of generating hypotheses regarding new
uses. The heavy prevalence of
off-label prescribing — which accounted for more than 20% of
prescriptions written by officebased physicians in 2001, according to one study5 — suggests
that hypotheses are pervasive.
The incentives question is important, however, because the ultimate objective, from the standpoint of both patient welfare and
cost, is reliable evidence of efficacy. Such evidence, which is required before the FDA can approve
labeling (or allow marketing) for
a new use, is generated through
investment in well-designed trials.
Such investment need not
emerge, however, only from individual firms operating in secrecy
and motivated by patents. Indeed,
one recent study found that publicly funded research formed the
foundation for almost all the newuse FDA approvals that were examined.6 Going forward, the public
sector’s role is likely to increase
— the new National Center for
Advancing Translational Sciences
at the National Institutes of Health
has explicitly embraced the search
for new uses in a number of the
programs it is funding.
In many arenas of innovation,
proprietary research models supported by intellectual property
and publicly funded open research
models not only coexist, they
play mutually reinforcing, synergistic roles. Brand-name firms
could view Caraco’s partial restriction on their deployment of overly broad use claims as an opportunity to rely less on dubious
legal tactics and more on the pursuit of opportunities to leverage
public-sector investment.
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